

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

---

SCOTT ALAN DUNHAM, )  
                          )  
Plaintiff,           ) Case No. 1:06-cv-165  
                          )  
v.                     ) Honorable Gordon J. Quist  
                          )  
(UNKNOWN) ABDELLATIF, )  
                          )  
Defendant.           ) \_\_\_\_\_  
                          )

**OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. No. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate exhaustion of available administrative remedies, the Court will dismiss his complaint without prejudice.

**Discussion**

I.       Factual allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF). In his *pro se* complaint, he sues Doctor (unknown) Abdellatif.

Plaintiff claims that he was involved in accidents in 1994 and 2004, that caused injury to his knees. As a result, Plaintiff has difficulty walking without a cane. With the assistance of a cane, Plaintiff alleges that he stopped falling, had fewer seizures, had improved equilibrium and

gained strength in his knees. Plaintiff claims that after conducting a cursory examination, Defendant Abdellatif told Plaintiff that he was fine and would not be provided with a cane at LRF. Plaintiff maintains that since his cane was taken, his knees have started “locking-up” and “giving out” and his seizures have increased in frequency. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

II. Lack of exhaustion of available administrative remedies

Plaintiff has failed sufficiently to allege and show exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust available administrative remedies. *See Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory and applies to all suits regarding prison conditions, regardless of the nature of the wrong or the type of relief sought. *Porter*, 534 U.S. at 520; *Booth*, 532 U.S. at 741. A district court must enforce the exhaustion requirement *sua sponte*. *Brown v. Toombs*, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998); *accord Wyatt v. Leonard*, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999).

A prisoner must allege and show that he has exhausted all available administrative remedies and should attach to his § 1983 complaint the administrative decision disposing of his complaint, if the decision is available. *Brown*, 139 F.3d at 1104. In the absence of written documentation, the prisoner must describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome so that the Court may determine what claims, if any, have been exhausted. *Knuckles El v. Toombs*, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, a prisoner must specifically mention the involved parties in the grievance to alert the prison officials to the problems so that the prison has a chance to address the claims before they reach federal court. *Curry v. Scott*, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001); *Thomas v. Woolum*, 337 F.3d 720, 735 (6th Cir. 2003); *Vandiver v. Martin*, No. 02-1338,

2002 WL 31166925, at \*2 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2002) (“The issues [plaintiff] may raise, and the defendants he may name, in his lawsuit are limited to the specific issues raised, and the specific individuals mentioned, in his grievance.”).

Plaintiff claims that he filed three grievances concerning his claim. *See MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ E* (may grieve “alleged violations of policy or procedure or unsatisfactory conditions of confinement”) (effective 12/19/03). Plaintiff, however, does not allege or show that he named Defendant Abdellatif in any of the Step I grievances. In order to properly exhaust, a prisoner must raise each of his claims for the first time at Step I. *Burton v. Jones*, 321 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2003). Raising allegations against a particular defendant for the first time at Step II or III is insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion. *Id.* at 576 n.4. The form provided by the Court, which Plaintiff used to file his action, explicitly states that a prisoner must attach his Step I, II and III grievances and grievance responses or “provide the Court with an affidavit describing the issues set forth in the Step I grievance, the people named in the Step I grievance and the response . . . [the prisoner] received at each level below . . . .” Plaintiff did not provide copies of his grievances or an affidavit setting forth what and who he grieved at Step I. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he specifically mentioned Defendant Abdellatif in one or more of his Step I grievances, he fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. *See Curry*, 249 F.3d at 505; *Burton*, 321 F.3d at 574.

It is not clear whether Plaintiff may still grieve his claims. Under the policy of the prison, complaints must be resolved expeditiously, and complaints may be rejected as untimely. *See Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ G(4)*. The Sixth Circuit has held that an inmate cannot simply claim that “he has exhausted his remedies or that it is futile for him to do so because his grievance is now

time-barred under the regulations.” *Hartsfield v. Vidor*, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing *Wright v. Morris*, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997)). However, even if the MDOC considers a subsequent grievance to be untimely, a prisoner who has presented a grievance through one complete round of the prison process will nevertheless be deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). *See Thomas*, 337 F.3d at 733.

Because the exhaustion requirement is no longer discretionary, but is mandatory, the Court does not have the discretion to provide a continuance in the absence of exhaustion. *See Wright*, 111 F.3d at 417. Rather, dismissal of this action without prejudice is appropriate when a prisoner has failed to show that he exhausted available administrative remedies. *See Brown*, 139 F.3d at 1104; *White v. McGinnis*, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997). Dismissal for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies does not relieve a plaintiff from payment of the civil action filing fee. *Smeltzer v. Hook*, 235 F. Supp. 2d 736, 746 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (citing *Omar v. Lesza*, No. 97 C 5817, 1997 WL 534361, at \*1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1997)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss his action without prejudice.

### Conclusion

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s action without prejudice because he has failed to show exhaustion as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$455

appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$455 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: June 2, 2006

---

/s/ Gordon J. Quist  
GORDON J. QUIST  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE